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iPreface
This master’s thesis was written during the spring semester 2014, at the Department of Produc-
tion and Quality Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Technology, NTNU. The thesis is part
of the two-year International master’s programme in RAMS at NTNU.
The title of the thesis is "Using reliability growth testing to reveal systematic faults in safety-
instrumented systems". The main objective of this thesis is to develop a procedure for how to
identify and correct systematic faults by reliability growth testing and the TAAF (test-analyze-
and-fix) cycle. This is a challenging topic that may have great effects on the development of
high-reliable safety-instrumented systems. Relevant challenges and pitfalls of reliability growth
testing in relation to systematic faults are identified and guidelines for such tests proposed. It is
assumed that the reader has some knowledge in safety and reliability analysis. It is preferable to
have some knowledge of the standards IEC 61508, IEC 61511 and IEC 61014.
Trondheim, June 24, 2014
Rowland Mbah
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Summary
This master thesis studies the effects of systematic faults in the development phase of a safety-
instrumented system, especially the relation between systematic faults and operational common-
cause failures. Safety-instrumented systems are used widely in many industry sectors to detect
the onset of hazardous events and mitigate the consequences to humans, the environment and
material assets.
Systematic faults are non- physical faults introduced due to design errors or mistakes. Uniden-
tified systematic faults represent a serious problem, as their safety effects are unpredictable and
are not normally susceptible to a statistical analysis like random faults. In addition to safety ef-
fects, there can also be economic losses through product recalls, high warranty costs, customer
dissatisfaction and loss of market share. Reliability growth testing is the same as TAAF (test-
analyze-and-fix) testing of a product early in the design and development phases of the product
life cycle when design changes can be made readily in response to observed failures. Reliability
growth testing, if applied in the development phase of a safety-instrumented system helps to
overcome the disadvantages of doing the test in other phases, because it can be costly, highly
inconvenient and time consuming in these phases.
The main focus of the thesis is to study, evaluate, and discuss to what extent reliability growth
testing of safety-instrumented systems is a suitable approach for identifying and avoiding sys-
tematic faults, and develop guidelines for reliability growth testing to achieve this purpose.
The thesis builds on concepts, methods and definitions adopted from two major standards
for safety-instrumented system applications: IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, and IEC 61014: Pro-
grammes for reliability growth. The development of procedures on how to identify and correct
systematic faults by reliability growth testing are inspired by these three standards and other
relevant literature found during the course of the master thesis project.
The main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Illustrative examples of fire and gas detection and mitigation systems, car airbag and mo-
iv
bile phone have been used to develop procedures on how reliability growth testing is used
to identify and correct systematic faults.
2. Detailed discussion of systematic faults, common-cause failures and the relationship be-
tween them have been presented. It has been established that systematic faults give rise to
common-cause failures, which dominate the reliability of safety-instrumented systems.
3. Detailed discussion of reliability growth testing, its models and methods, and strengths
and weaknesses of the models and methods have been provided. Both continuous and
discrete models are studied. The Duane model, which is an example of a continuous
model is commonly used because of its simplicity and graphical presentation.
4. The challenges and pitfalls of reliability growth testing in relation to systematic faults are
discussed. The major challenge is the introduction of new failure modes, especially in
case of software testing.
5. Measures to handle systematic faults revealed during the test have been provided. The
measures include: use of diverse and redundant channels, design reviews, use of simple
designs, use of competent designers, training and re-training of designers and use of re-
liability analysis to identify causes of faults [such as Failure Modes Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA)]
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The importance of safety-instrumented systems (SISs), especially in the oil and gas industries
cannot be overstated; SISs play a major role in keeping the risk arising from manufacturing, pro-
cess or transportation activities within tolerable limits. A SIS comprises sensors, logic solvers,
and final elements as shown in Figure 2.1
Systematic faults influence the availability of SIS negatively. It is beneficial to reveal and cor-
rect systematic faults at the design and development phases of the SIS life cycle because it can
be costly, highly inconvenient and time-consuming after these phases. SIS reliability require-
ments are specified in the international standards IEC 61508 (2010), IEC 61511 (2003) and other
sector-specific standards. These standards provide a general framework and requirements for
the design, development and operation of a SIS. According to these standards, the SIS system
integrator must use a formalized system for identification and avoidance of systematic faults.
Reliability growth testing (RGT) and the TAAF (Test, Analyze, and Fix) cycle are the approaches
used for this purpose in this thesis.
A lot of work has been done on RGT by Quigley and Walls (1999); Walls and Quigley (2001)
and Krasich et al. (2004). The RGT models and methods used to assess reliability growth are
classified into continuous and discrete models (Duane, 1964; Crow, 1975). The Duane and AM-
SAA (Army Material Systems Analysis Activity) models are examples of continuous models; the
2
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Wolman model and the Lloyd/Lipow model (Lloyd and Lipow, 1963) are examples of discrete
models. The Duane model is used even by strong advocates of the AMSAA model because it is
very simple to use and can be presented graphically.
Systematic faults and common cause faults have been studied by Gentile and Summers
(2006) and Hauge et al. (2004). A systematic fault may affect all forms of components be it hard-
ware or software. The fault may be introduced in the design or the manufacturing process, or
it may be related to maintenance or modification activities. A common-cause failure (CCF) is
a failure that occurs when failures of separate channels are triggered concurrently. The failures
are considered concurrent if the interval between the failures is too short for repair or recovery
measures to be taken (NP-T-1.5, 2009). Systematic faults are of great importance because they
may give rise to CCFs, which dominate the reliability of a SIS. Systematic faults do not give rise to
CCF if the redundant channels are not challenged and also if the failures affect only one channel.
In order to demonstrate how RGT is used to reveal faults, illustrative examples of fire and gas
detection and mitigation systems, car airbag, and mobile phone were used. A mobile phone,
though, not a SIS, is used for a clearer understanding of the principle. RGT as used in the thesis,
can be formal, semi-formal or informal. Formal testing means testing in the laboratory in con-
trolled conditions and an environment that mimics the real world in a limited manner. Informal
testing is releasing the product to a limited number of customers or to employees of the manu-
facturer to use and keep appriopriate information relating usage mode and intensity, operating
environment, failure modes and report back to the design team for necessary corrections in de-
sign. The systematic faults revealed are handled and the SIS is modified, as the consequences of
not doing so can have great impact on the SIS. The IEC 61508 focuses on qualitative mearsures
for handling systematic faults by using requirements and checklists. Documents and guidelines
on how the standards should be adopted are provided in Lundteigen and Rausand (2006) and
NOG 070 (2004). The two main methods used to minimize the number of faults in SIS are fault
avoidance/prevention and fault detection/removal. These two methods apply measures such
as; design reviews, use of redundant and diverse channels, use of simple design, use of compe-
tent designers, and training of designers.
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1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this master thesis is to study, evaluate, and discuss to what extent RGT of
a SIS is a suitable approach for identifying and avoiding systematic faults. If the conclusion is
affirmative, another objective is to establish guidelines for RGT for this purpose and to identify
challenges and pitfalls related to such testing. To achieve these objectives, the following sub-
objectives are deduced:
1. Explain the meaning of systematic faults of a SIS
2. Present the classes of systematic faults
3. Describe the relationships between systematic faults and CCF
4. Present the types of systematic faults that can be introduced in the design and develop-
ment phases of the SIS lifecycle
5. Explain the meaning of RGT
6. Present the models and methods available for RGT
7. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various models and methods for RGT
8. Verify if reliability RGT can be used to identify systematic faults
9. Identify how such tests can be implemented
10. Present and discuss the challenges and pitfalls related to RGT in relation to systematic
faults
1.3 Limitations
The focus of this thesis is on using RGT to reveal systematic faults in SISs that are introduced
in the design and development phases. It does not include other phases in the SIS lifecycle.
Moreover, random hardware failures are outside the scope of this thesis, as it is restricted to sys-
tematic faults.
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Also, for the purpose of this thesis, RGT can be carried out by formal, semi-formal and infor-
mal methods. These methods are explained in details in this report.
1.4 Structure of the Report
The rest of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brieft introduction to SISs and
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) based on IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. Chapter 3 presents overview of
the overall safety lifecycle and product lifecycle, also activities performed in each phase of the
product lifecycle to obtain high reliability are discussed. Chapter 4 discusses systematic faults,
its importance and types of systematic faults that can be revealed in the design and develop-
ment phase. Common-cause failures and its relationship with systematic faults are presented
in chapter 5. Chapter 6 deals with RGT, its models and methods, the strengths and weaknesses
of the models and methods. Chapter 7 discusses RGT for systematic faults using some illus-
trative examples. Finally, Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks and issues requiring further
research.
Chapter 2
Introduction to safety-instrumented
systems and safety integrity level
Most well-designed systems have protection equipment or other features to protect people, the
environment , and other assets against harm should failures or dangerous deviations occur in
the system (Rausand, 2011).
SIS have been used for many years to perform safety-instrumented funct ion in the process
industries (IEC 61508, 2010). The main purpose of a safety-instrumented system (SIS) is to pro-
vide the necessary protection by bringing the plant or equipment to a safe state if a hazardous
event occurs. In other words, SISs are designed to respond to deviations in normal operation
and maintain a safe state for the system.
They are used in many sectors of our society: for example, as emergency shutdown systems
in hazardous chemical plants, fire and gas detection and alarm systems, pressure protection sys-
tems, and dynamic positioning systems for ships and offshore platforms (Rausand, 2011). SISs
are subject to specific expectations about performance, like high reliability and short response
time. There are some key properties that impact the performance of the SIS both in design and
operation, therefore is need for laid down guidelines on how to operate and design such systems
(Hoem, 2013).
Several standards have been issued setting requirements to the SIS (Rausand and Høyland,
2004). Almost every safety-related system has at least one electrical, electronic, or programmable
electronic (E/E/PE) component. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) pub-
6
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lished the international standard IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/ electonic/ programmable
electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems, with the last version from 2010. This is the main stan-
dard for the construction of safety-critical systems such as SIS worldwide.
The sizes of SIS applications range from the smallest High Integrity Pressure Protection Sys-
tem (HIPPS) containing just few signals up to large emergency shutdown (ESD) systems with
several thousand input and output points. The challenge to anyone designing a complex system
such as programmable electronic system is to determine how much rigour/ assurance/ confi-
dence is necessary for the specified safety performance level (Bell, 2006). IEC 61508 has come
up with two concepts, which are fundamental to its application, with the following basis:
• Safety integrity level: That it is possible to quantify the random hardware failures and
therefore estimate whether the target failure measure has been achieved.
• Safety lifecycle: That it is not possible to quantify those elements giving rise to sytematic
failure behviour.
2.1 Definition of Safety-Instrumented Systems
A SIS is an independent portection layer that is installed to mitigate the risk associated with the
operation of a specified hazardous system, which is referred to as the Equipment Under Control
(EUC) (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). The main purpose of SIS is to prevent hazardous event by
putting the EUC in safe state. SIS is referred to as E/E/PE safety-related system in IEC 61508.
In other industry sectors, safety related systems has their names such as Instrumentation and
Control (I&C) in the nuclear industry, and safety-related electrical control systems for machin-
ery. In IEC 61511: Part 1 - Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements,
this safety related system is defined as a safety-instrumented system:
Z Safety-instrumented system: SIS is used to implement one or more safety-instrumented
functions. A SIS is composed of any combinations of sensors, logic solvers and final elements
(IEC 61511, 2003). This is shown in Figure 2.1.
.
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Figure 2.1: A simplified illustration of a SIS
(Lundteigen, 2009).
Figure 2.2: A simplified illustration of HIPPSl
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
An example of a SIS can be a HIPPS which includes at least a single logic solver, a single
shutdown valve as a final element, and two pressure transmitters giving input to the logic solver.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
2.2 Safety- Instrumented Function
A SIS is a physical system that performs one or more SIFs. The basis for the performance eval-
uation of the SIF is safety targets through hazard analysis and risk assessment (ISA-TR84.00.02,
2002). Safety-instrumented function (SIF) are in IEC 61511: Part 1 defined as;
Z Safety-instrumented function: a safety function with a specified safety integrity level which
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is necessary to achieve functional safety and which can be either a safety instrumented protec-
tion function or a safety-instrumented control function (IEC 61511, 2003).
A SIF may fail in two main failure modes. The modes are;
• Fail-to-function mode: When the specified deviation occurs in the EUC, and the SIS is not
able perform the required SIF.
• Spurious activation: The SIF is performed without the presence of a predefined deviation
(process demand) in the EUC. This failure mode is also known as Spurious trip or False
alarm (Rausand, 2011).
Taking into account the HIPPS example given in the previous section, one of the SIFs can be,
to fully close the shutdown valve (SDV) within 5 seconds after the pressure transmitters have
detected overpressure in the pipeline. Highly reliable SISs like this one are often achieved by fail-
safe design principles (e.g., the valves closes automatically upon loss of utility sytems) (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009). A fail to fuction mode in this example can be if the SDV fully closes first af-
ter 7 seconds. While a spurious trip has occured if the SDV closes even though the pressure in
the separator is within the safe limit because of a false alarm from the pressure transmitters. In
other words, this particular SIF will not function as safety barrier if the valve closes too slowly.
The failure mode is a description of fault(s) that caused the valve not to close within the time
limit, and the criticality of the failure will obviously increase with the deviation from the target
closing time.
It is important to realize that a failure mode is a manifestation of the failure as seen from
outside, that is, the termination of one or more functions (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). An-
other example Internal leakage is a failure mode of a shutdown valve, since the valve loses its
required function to "close flow". Wear of the valve seal, however, represents a cause of failure
and hence not a failure mode of the valve. In this example, an investigation is needed to deter-
mine if the failure is a random hardware failure or a systematic failure. From the outside, one
can easily discover that a valve has failed and also whether the failure is caused by wear and tear
(random hardware failure) or by wrong installation (systematic failure). Failure classification
will be discussed in details in the next chapter.
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2.3 Safety Integrity Level
Safety integrity is a performance measure for safety functions. In IEC 61508, safety integrity is a
fundamental concept, defined as:
Z Safety integrity: probability of an E/E/PE safety related system (can be a SIS) satisfactorily
performing the specific safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of
time (IEC 61508, 2010).
It is the freedom of safety functions from flaws. IEC 61508 specifies the safety integrity re-
quirements for each safety function in terms of either
• the average probability of a dangerous failure on demand of the function for a low demand
mode of operation or
• the avearge frequency of a dangerous failure of the safety function for a high demand or a
continuous demand mode of operation (IEC 61508, 2010)
These frequencies are defined as probability of failure on demand (PFD) or probability of failure
per hour (PFH) . "Failure on demand" here means failure likely to be observed when a demand
occurs and should not be mixed up with the probability of a failure due to a demand. The fre-
quencies are calculated from failure rates of dangerous undetected failures. It should be noted
that probability of failure on demand are only accounting for random hardware failure in IEC
61508 and IEC 61511.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is an indication of the required level of protection against failure
i.e., integrity level indicates the degree to which a component must be free from flaws. The
problem is that random failures can be designed against while systematic failures are not known
in advance and any further design may introduce further errors. In the standards, four SILs are
given, and presented in Table 4.1, where SIL 1 is the lowest and least reliable, and SIL 4 is the
highest and most reliable. The principle of SIL is that it should be allocated early in the lifecycle
to systems, functions and components. The allocated integrity levels then define appriopriate
degree of rigour and scrutiny applied in the development. Intuition is that better development
techniques will result in inclusion of fewer systematic flaws.
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Table 2.1: SIL table (IEC 61511, 2003)
SIL Low-demand (PFDavg) High-demand (PFH)
4 ≥ 10−5to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9to < 10−8
3 ≥ 10−4to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8to < 10−7
2 ≥ 10−3to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7to < 10−6
1 ≥ 10−2to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6to < 10−5
This specified target ranges for the PFD or the PFH is the quantitative requirements for the
hardware of a SIS (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). In addition, the SIL outlines the require-
ments for architectural constraints. In addition, the SIL outlines the requirements for archi-
tectural constraints and together with the systematic safety integrity constitutes the qualitative
reliability the SIF should comply with. IEC 61508 distinguish between three categories of safety
integrity:
• Hardware safety integrity
• Systematic safety integrity
• Software integrity
Software integrity is relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure that are at-
tributable to software (IEC 61508, 2010). To meet a specified SIL requirement, it is necessary to
demonstrate that all parts achieve the specified SIL. If, for example, it is confirmed that a SIF
meets SIL 2 in terms of hardware safety integrity, we cannot claim compliance to this SIL unless
the systematic and software integrity also meets SIL 2 (Lundteigen, 2009).
2.4 Determination of Safety Integrity Level
There are several methods used to determine or assign a SIL and there is no one method suitable
for all applications. Any method adopted should put into consideration factors that influences
method of determining SIL. It is shown by IEC 61508 (2010) that the following methods listed
below are used. Reference should be made to the standards for more details.
• ALARP method (as low as reasonably practicable)
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• Quantitative method of SIL determination
• Risk graph method
• Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method
To choose an appriopriate method to assign SIL for a safety instrumented function, the factors
below should be considered as stated in (IEC 61508, 2010):
1. The risk acceptance criteria.
2. Mode of operation of the safety function.
3. Confidence that the resulting residual risk meets specified criteria.
4. Severity of consequences.
5. Occurence of common cause failures and demand causes.
6. Use of more than one method to determine SIL.
7. Knowledge and experience of persons undertaking the SIL determination.
8. The existing approach used for SIL determination.
Chapter 3
Introduction to Safety Life Cycle and
Product Life Cycle
3.1 Introduction
A SIS is installed on the equipment under control (EUC) to perform the designated safety func-
tion. An EUC can be any equipment (e.g., machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufac-
turing, processing, transportation and so on) that the SIS is installed for. Several qualitative
and quantitative aspects should be taken into account while implementing a SIS. These aspects
normally encompass the whole life span of the SIS, i.e., each relevant activity from manufac-
turing, through use, to discarding. Accordingly, it has be shown by (IEC 61508, 2010) and (IEC
61511, 2003) the relevant requirements through the overall safety life cycle (SLC). This chapter
discusses the main issues in the overall SLC as established in IEC 61508. The overall SLC is a fun-
damental concept of IEC 61508 because the sum total of all the technical and non-technical re-
quirements of a SIS during design, development, operation and maintenance to decommission-
ing are adressed using the overall SLC as a framework. This general framework creates common
understanding between parties involved (e.g., suppliers, system integrators, operators, consul-
tants, regulatory bodies and so on) in the life span of the SIS. That is, the requirements in the
SLC serve as common references for parties who are taking part in any phase (Jigar, 2013).
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3.2 Overall Safety Life Cycle
The overall SLC is the foundation of the requirements in IEC 61508. All requirements and parts
of the standard are directly linked to this fundamental concept. Broadly, the purpose is to
demonstrate the development and documentation of a safety plan and its execution until de-
commissioning. It enables us to approach all activities during the whole life span of the SIS in a
systematic manner so that the required safety performance can be achieved.
3.3 Objectives
Key objectives of SLC are highlighted below.
1. Provide optimal design of SIS and other safety related systems that matches the risk re-
duction with process risk.
2. Ensure consistent, cost-effective design of SIS and other safety related systems while re-
ducing error by verifying procedures.
3. Reduce likelihood of immature failures, minimize maintenance by selection of proper
technology and correct specification of equipments.
3.4 Safety Life Cycle and Standards
SLC is a framework for implementing and managing safety systems throughout its lifecycle. This
framework has enjoyed wide acceptance and thus have been adopted by many recognized stan-
dards. Some of the notable standards that use the concept of SLC are IEC 61508, IEC 61511,
and ANSI/ISA-S84-01-1996 (replaced by ANSI/ASI-084.00.01-2004). ANSI/ISA-S84-01-1996 be-
ing the first to introduce the concept of SLC (Ali, 2007).
3.4.1 IEC 61508 and Safety Life Cycle Classification
The overall SLC model can be classified into three phases namely; analysis, realization and op-
eration.
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Figure 3.1: Overall Safety Life Cycle
(IEC 61508, 2010)
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1. The Analysis phase This part takes into account identification of hazards and hazardous
events, the probability of these hazardous events occuring and their potential consequences
when they occur. This phase also considers the layer of protection available to prevent
and mitigate the hazard or hazardous event and the need to implement a SIS to prevent
it. A document called Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) should be established after
allocating the overall safety integrity requirements to the SIS.
2. The Realization phase This phase deals with the design and fabrication of E/E/PE safety re-
lated systems. It also includes other risk reduction systems or facilities. This thesis report
deals majorly with this phase. This phase can be further classified into three: pre-design
and development, design and development, and post-design and development.
Pre-Design and Development
Realization begins with describing the design/architecture of the SIS under the so-called
SIS design requirements specification. It is primarily derived from the SRS, but in this case
design requirements are specified at subsystem, element and/or component level. The
specification should contain detailed descriptions in terms of hardware and software of
the SIS. Since it is the foundation for the realization of the SIS, great care should be taken to
be able to demonstrate in detail how the requirements in the SRS are fulfilled. In addition,
appriopriate methods should be implemented to avoid some misspecification problems.
The development of SIS design requirements specification is an iterative process where it
is updated over time and becomes more mature as the design progresses. Like any other
activity in the SLC, the document needs to be comprehensive and traceable for those who
may use it in any activity in the SLC.
Design and Development
This phase is normally performed parallel with safety validation planning (box 7 in Fig-
ure 3.1). This is a plan containing proper procedures (activities) to be implemented to val-
idate whether or not the SIS performs the safety function as desired, i.e., a plan to demon-
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strate, before commissioning, that the SIS satisfies all the requirements in the SRS and SIS
design requirements specification. For example, the plan may include the environment
under which the test is to take place, the pass/fail criteria (policy), words on how to deal
with the results and other related issues. Design and develoment is a broad, time con-
suming and resource-intense part of the overall SLC. The design, hardware or software, of
a SIS shall meet all requirements related to
(a) Hardware safety integrity
(b) Systematic safety integrity
(c) Architecture of integrity circuits (ICs) with one chip redundancy
(d) System behaviour on detection of a fault
(e) Data communication processes
Systematic failures During design and development of hardware and software, necessary
attentions should be given to avoid systematic failures. Often due their nature, it is diffi-
cult to avoid or control such failures. There are always some residuals left in the system,
especially the ones related to operational failures. However, it is possible to reduce their
effects up to some extent by exploiting appriopriate methods, procedures and/or docu-
mentation. It is also necessary to make sure that the design could not cause other safety
system(s) to fail. Analysis should be conducted to determine this, and if it causes failure,
the design has to be changed (prefered) or the likelihood has to be reduced. This masters
thesis report shall be dealing mainly on how to reveal this systematic faults especially in
the design and development phase. Systematic faults shall be extensively discussed in the
next chapter.
Post-Design and Development
Once the design and development of the SIS is completed, components/ elements/ sub-
systems need to be integrated correctly to have a complete SIS. It shall then be tested
to see whether they interact each other as intended or not. It should also be tested to
see whether or not it performs only its intended function. If tests reveal any unpleasant
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result, design change or modification is required and the procedures should again obey
all the requirements. Whenever changes are made, version numbers should be written
clearly on the document. It is part of the realization phase to provide procedures that
will be implemented during operation and maintenance activites so as to maintain the
achieved performance. It may consist issues related to the proper actions that need to
be done by the operators (e.g., during start up, fault condition, shut down), maintenance
procedures (e.g., fault diagnosis, repair, revalidation), documentation of system failure
and component failure data, and so on. SIS validation can be considered as the final ac-
tivity of the realization phase. This has to be done according to the plan developed in the
beginning of the phase. It encompasses all aspects of the reqiurements. The integrated
system needs to be tested for validity against the requirements in the SRS and SIS design
requirements specification as well as the procedures developed to be implemented during
operation and maintenance. If validation activity is not satisfactory, appriopriate modi-
fications, corrections or enhancements should be done. After these activities the system
should be revalidated, reverified, and documented with another version. In parallel with
the realization phase, it has suggested in the standard to make an overall plan in relation
to
• Operation and maintenance
• Safety validation
• Installation and commissioning
3. The Operation phase This is the final part and covers startup, operation, maintenance and
decommissioning of the E/E/PE safety related systems.
To implement the standard properly, from the onset the organization should appoint one or
more persons who take care of one or more of the activities in the overall SLC. Persons need to
be competent and knowledgeable for the activity they are assigned (see clause 6 of IEC 61508-1).
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3.5 Product Life and Product Life Cycles
3.5.1 Product Life
The uesful life of a product is the age beyond which the product is deemed to be unsuitable
for further use due to its inability to perform satisfactorily. This is a random variable due to
variation in manufacturing and/or usage. For a repairable product, a component can fail several
times over its useful life and is restored to operational status through corrective actions (Murthy
et al., 2008).
Considering new products, a related concept is the time for which a consumer uses the pur-
chased product before it is replaced by a new one. This is called period of ownership. This is also
a random variable as different consumers keep the purchased product for different lenghts. If
consumers keep the products for the useful life, then the products are scrapped at the end of
their useful life. In this case, there are no second-hand products. If the period of ownership is
shorter than the useful life, a market for second-hand products is created.
From the consumer’s perspective, the product life cycle is the time from the purchase of an
item to its discarding when it reaches the end of its useful life or being replaced earlier due to
obsolete technology or the item being no longer in vogue. The life cycle here is divided into
three phases:
• Acquisition
• Operation and maintenance
• Discard (and leading to replacement by new one)
From the manufacturer’s perspective, the concept of marketing and manufacturing arises.
• Marketing: The product life cycle is the period from the instant the product is launched
on the market to the time when it is withdrawn from the market and involves the following
four phases:
1. Introduction. This phase is characterised with low sales
2. Growth. This phase has a rapid increase in sales
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Figure 3.2: Phases of product life cycle
Figure 3.3: Product life cycle model
(Murthy et al., 2008).
3. Maturity. This phase has a near constant sales
4. Decline. The phase is characterised with decreasing sales
• Manufacturing: The product life cycle is the period from the initial conception of the
product to the final withdrawal of the product from the marketplace. It is divided into
five phases as shown in Figure 3.2.
3.6 RAMS-Oriented Product Life Cycle Model
Even though many new product development models discuss product performance and spec-
ifications, no model have addressed this in an effective manner. Murthy et al. (2008) proposes
a new model that is more appriopriate for making decisions relating to performance and spec-
ification in new product development. It is closely linked to the product life cycle model and
involves three stages and three levels as shown in Figure 3.3. The three stages are as follows:
Stage I (Pre-development/Specification): This stage is concerned with a non-physical (or ab-
stract) conceptualization of the product with increasing level of detail.
Stage II (Development/Verification): This stage checks whether the prototype product can
satisfy the requirement.
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Stage III (Post-development/Substantiation): This stage is concerned with the remainder of
the product life cycle (e.g., production, sale, use) subsequent to the new product development.
The three levels are as follows:
Level I (Business level): This level is concerned with the linking of business objectives for a
new product to the desired product attributes.
Level II (System, i.e., product level): This level is concerned with linking the product at-
tributes to product characteristics.
Level III (Component level): This level is concerned with linking product characteristics to
lower level product characteristics, at an increasing detail.
The RAMS-oriented model has eight phases as shown in Figure 3.3:
Phase 1 (Stage-I, Level-I): In this phase the need for a new product is identified and the de-
cision related to the product attributes (customer’s view of the product) are made from the top
management level of the business.
Phase 2 (Stage-I, Level-II): In this phase the product attributes are translated into product
characteristics (engineer’s view of the product).
Phase 3 (Stage-I, Level-III): In this phase the detailed design (proceeding from product to
component) of the product is carried out in order to arrive at a set of specifications that will
ensure that the product has required characteristics.
Phase 4 (Stage-II, Level-I): This phase deals with the product development/verification, from
component to product - and ends up with the product prototype.
Phase 5 (Stage-II, Level-II): In this phase the prototype is released to a limited number of
consumers to evaluate the customers’ assessment of the product features.
Phase 6 (Stage-III, Level-III): This phase deals with the production of products starting from
component and ending with the product for release to customers.
Phase 7 (Stage-III, Level-II): This phase looks at field performance of the product taking into
account the variability in usage intensity, operating environment, and so on, from the customers
perspective.
The link between the phases of the RAMS-oriented model and the product life cycle phases
is illustrated in Figure 4.2
This thesis report will concentrate mainly on phases 3, 4 and 5.
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between RAMS-oriented model and Product life cycle model
(Murthy et al., 2008).
3.7 Activities Performed in each Phase of the Product Life Cycle
to Obtain High Reliability
The motivation of the manufacturer to integrate reliability into the product life cycle can be
attributed to the conflicting interests of the manufacturer and the consumer. The manufacturer
wants the product realisation process to be minimized with respect to time and cost, conversely,
the consumer expects the products to operate reliably and to incur little or no maintenance
costs.
Z Reliability is defined as the probability that a product performs its intended functions with-
out failure under specified conditions for a specified period of time.
The aim of reliabilty engineering is to ensure that a product is operated without failure,
which in reality is not feasible. Reliability engineering is implemented by taking structured and
feasible actions that maximize reliability and minimize the effects of failures. To accomplish this
objective, the steps taken according to Yang (2007) are:
• Build maximum reliability into a product during the design and development stage.
• Minimize production process variation to assure that the process does not appreciably
degrade the inherent reliability.
• Initiate appriopriate maintenance operations to alleviate performance degradation and
prolong product life for a product that have been deployed to the market.
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The following reliability techniques are employed in the three steps: reliability planning and
specification, allocation, prediction, robust reliability design, failure mode effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA), fault tree analysis (FTA), accelerated life testing, degradation testing, reliability
verification testing, stress screening, and warranty analysis. The reliability tasks are adapted to fit
the needs of specific products and enforced throughout the product life cycle. They add value
to the products in the product realization process.
In the product planning phase (i.e., Phase 1), a team of reliability experts is formed whose
duty is to set a reliability target that will translate customer expectations into engineering re-
quirements. Functional analysis and quality function deployment (QFD) is done at this stage
where functions of product/system is identified. The functions to be involved in RAMS analysis
should also be decided at this stage. Reliability history analysis where customer feedback, test
data, and warranty failure data of the prior-generation product are also collected and analyzed
at this phase. The analysis should indicate whether customer wants were not resonably satisfied
and reveal areas to be improved upon. The reliability decisions made in this phase will have a
great impact in the other stages of the product life cycle. For instance, setting a reliability tar-
get has strong effect on cost, time to market, and competitiveness (Yang, 2007). An immensely
ambitious target would lead to a high design and development cost and prolong the product re-
alization process and losses may be incurred. Conversely, a low reliability target will undermine
competitiveness by losing customers.
In Phase 2, reliability planning and specification with the objective of establishing a reliabil-
ity target that is economically achievable and develop an effective reliability program to reach
or exceed the target. Results from QFD and reliability history analysis are used at this stage.
Also reliability modeling where product reliability are modelled according to the structure of
the product which may be in series, parallel or more complex configurations. Product reliabil-
ity is expressed as a function of component reliabilities. This relationship is useful in reliability
allocation, prediction, and analysis (Yiliu).
The objective of reliability tasks carried out in Phase 3 is to design-in the reliability of the
product while designing-out potential failure modes. The tasks include reliability allocation;
where the established reliability targets are equally distributed to lower-level structures (sub-
systems, modules, or components) of the product. The reliabilities allocated to a structure be-
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comes the reliability target of that structure. Reliability prediction; In the early design stage,
predicted reliabilities are used for comparing design alternatives and components, identifying
potential design issues, determining if a design meets the allocated reliability target, and pro-
jecting reliability in the field. Robust design; This is used to build robustness and reliability into
the products in the design stage through the implementation of a three-stage process of concept
design, parameter design and tolerance design. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA); This is done to reveal potential failure modes, analyze effects and determine causes
of failure. This process is intended to detect design errors that have been built into a design so
that corrective actions can be carried out.
In Phase 4, reliability testing; this is done in the early design stage for the purpose of com-
paring design options, uncovering failure modes, estimating reliability, and verifying a design.
Testing a product to failure at normal operating condition is not economically feasible, there-
fore, accelerated life tests at higher stress levels, which shorten test time and reduce test costs
are conducted. Reliability growth testing; this is performed to assess current reliability, identify
and eliminate faults, and forecast future reliability.
In Phase 5, reliability improvement is carried out to improve the product when the results
of the tests are not good so as to meet reliability requirements and safety standards. Reliability
growth analysis is performed to achieve product reliability targets. Reliability growth analysis
consist of improving products whenever failure shows up during testing, this is known as test-
fix test approach, or after the test, called the test-find test approach.
In Phase 6, production control and assurance is done to assure that the process results in
the manufacture of uniform and reliable products. To maintain a stable process over time, pro-
cess control plans and charts are implemented to monitor the process and help identify special
causes as soon as they emerge. Stress screening is done to reveal latent defects due to material
flaws, process variation or inadequate design. Defective products will fail in early service time
and should be eliminated before the product is shipped to customers.
In Phase 7, warranty and maintenance plan development, is carried out when the product is
ready for marketing. The warranty repair cost may be estimated from warranty repair modeling
or reliability prediction.
In Phase 8, field failure tracking intended to collect failure information from warranty re-
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pairs and customer complaints are carried out. Also warranty data analysis done to estimate
field reliability, project warranty repair numbers and costs, monitor field failure modes and pat-
terns. Early detection of unusual failure modes and high failure probability can promote correc-
tive actions to change ongoing manufacturing process and repair strategies. Total cost and profit
analysis; After a certain period of delivery of the products, information about selling, warranty,
customer satisfaction can be collected. It is proper to evaluate the product performance for the
target of the company, and then generate new ideas for new products.
Chapter 4
Systematic Faults/Failure Classification
The importance of failure classification in the lifecycle assessment of a SIS cannot be over-
emphasized. The types of failures and their potential effects on the SIS help us to fully un-
derstand the lifecycle requirements. The ambiguous separation between a random failure and
systematic failure is one of the reasons for the concept of systematic failures to be contested.
4.1 Failure or Fault?
This masters thesis report deals with systematic faults but the expression used in the reliability
framework of SIS and mostly in the standards is systematic failures. This section tries to explain
the relationship between a failure and a fault, and why there is no consistency in the use of only
one expression.
Z Failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function.
It is important to note that after a failure, the item has a fault. Failure is an event, as distin-
guished from fault, which is a state. This concept does not apply to items consisting of software
only.
Z Fault is the state of an item characterized by its inability to perform a required function,
excluding the inability during preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or due to lack
26
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between failure and fault concepts
(ISO/TR 12489, 2013).
of external resources.
A fault is often the result of a failure of the item itself, but may exist without prior failure.
From the above definitions, it can be said that a fault may not give rise to a failure, but that
all failures result in faults. This implies that a systematic failure is a systematic fault. A fault
of an item may result from a failure of the item or from a deficiency in an earler stage of the
lifecycle, such as specification, design, manufacture, or maintenance. The relationship between
the concept of failure and fault is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The Failure x occurs at stage 1 and leads to the state Fault x which is not detected. From
stage 2 point of view Fault x is a pre-existing fault. The Failure y occurs at stage 2 and lead to the
state Faults x,y which is not detected. From stage 3 point of view Fault x,y is a pre-existing fault.
The process continues in that order.
4.2 Systematic Failures versus Systemic Failures
Systematic failures are failures occuring in a deterministic way when given conditions are en-
countered. It should not be confused with systemic failures. Systemic failures (holistic failure)
are failures at system level which cannot be simply described from the individual component
failures of the system (ISO/TR 12489, 2013).
Systemic/holistic principles have been concisely summarized by Aristotle by "The whole is
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more than the sum of its parts". Components only have failure modes. Those failure modes
become dangerous, safe or spurious only when the components are implemented into a safety
"system". This is why dangerous, safe or spurious failures are typical systemic failures. For
example, the failure "fail to close" of a valve is dangerous only if it belongs to a safety system
closing this valve on demand. Otherwise this failure mode does not matter.
4.3 Systematic Failure versus Random Hardware Failure
It has been shown by IEC 61508 (2010), IEC 61511 (2003), Hauge et al. (2010) and Hauge et al.
(2013) that failures can be categorised based on the failure cause. The two classes are: random
hardware failure and systematic failure. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Random hardware failures are failures due to physical causes and only apply to the simple
hardware components within a system. This type of failure is caused by effects such as corro-
sion, thermal stressing, and wear-out. Due to their random nature, statistical information can
be produced from testing and historical data about this type of fault. Thus, the average proba-
bility, and hence the risk, associated with the occurrence of a random fault can be calculated.
ISA-TR84.00.01 in line with the concept of Table 4.1, defines fault as a state resulting in two
types of events:
Z Faults can result in two types of failures:
• Random failures, a spontaneous failure of a component.
• Systematic failures (or errors), a hidden fault in design or implementation (ISA-TR 84.00.04)
The difference between random and systematic failure is summarized in Table 4.1 as repro-
duced from Annex G in ISA-TR84.00.04.
Systematic failures as defined in PDS are failures related to a particular cause other than nat-
ural degradation. They are due to human errors during specification, design, operation, main-
tenance and decommissioning phases of the lifecycle. The scope of the report is only on the
design and development stage.
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Figure 4.2: Failure classification by cause
(ISO/TR 12489, 2013).
Table 4.1: Summary of the important differences between random and systematic failures (ISA-
TR 84.00.04)
Random failures Systematic failures
Will always occur under the same conditions No Yes
Effectively prevented by redundancy Yes No
Effectively prevented by diversity in redundancy Yes Partially
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4.3.1 Definition of Systematic Faults by Standards and Guidelines
IEC 61508 is the most important standard for design, implementation and maintenance of reli-
able SISs. The main feature that distinguishes the functional safety standards from other safety
related standards is that, functional safety standards are performance based whereas many
other standards are prescriptive standards (Jin). This includes work process, procedures, and
tools for the user to decide, based on the desired safety integrity level, how the SIS should be
designed, implemented, operated and maintained.
Most international and national standards concerning functional safety have similar defi-
nitions for SIS, SIF, EUC, common cause failures (CCF) and other terms within the framework.
ANSI/ISA-84-01 and IEC 61508/61511 also refer to each other.
When it comes to failure classification and handling of these failures, there are different
methods and guidelines. A suitable standard should provide guidelines to help the user to un-
derstand the correct meaning of the definition, get a sufficient knowledge of the principles and
framework, and in this case understand what a systematic fault is, how to classify them, the re-
lationship between systematic faults and CCFs and the types of systematic faults that can be
introduced in the design and development phases of the life cycle of the SIS.
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511
The definitions of a systematic failure and a fault given in IEC 61508-4 and in IEC 61511-1 are
identical:
Z Systematic failure: failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only
be eliminated by a modification of the design or of other relevant factors (IEC 61508, 2010; IEC
61511, 2003).
The ISA-TR84.00.04 (2005 edition)
This technical report with the title Guidelines for the implementation of ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004
deals with SIS for the process industries and implementation of IEC 61511. The technical report
includes 16 informative annexes providing guidance from the ISA-SP84 committee on a wide
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range of topics, where some are related to failure classification and handling of systematic faults.
It defines systematic failures in this way:
Z Systematic failures are due to mistakes or errors made in the SIF design and management
and cause the SIF to fail every time a particular set of conditions occurs.
This definition is similar to other previous definitions but was presented in more clear terms.
Three types of errors that can lead to systematic failures are presented in the standard as dis-
cussed below:
Z Specification errors: mistakes and omissions made during the design process, such as in-
correct actuator sizing or inappriopriate materials of construction selection. These errors exist
from the point of installation and remain throughout the SIS’s life.
Z Equipment errors such as a bad installation, improper bypassing, and poor maintenance,
may occur at any stage in the safety life cycle.
Z Software errors: may arise from errors in the initial programming or be introduced when the
software is modified, intentionally or unintentionally.
The type of errors and the examples given, demonstrate the high degree of difficulty and
impossibility of quantifying or predicting how often systematic failure leads to SIF failure.
ISO/TR 12489 (2013 edition)
This technical report Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas indutries - Reliability modelling
and calculation of safety systems, sees systematic failures as failures that consistently occur un-
der particular conditions of handling, storage, or use. The cause of a systematic failure orig-
inates in the specification, design, manufacture, installation, operation or maintenance. Its
occurrence is precipitated by particular conditions of handling, storage, use or maintenance.
Corrective maintenance without modification will usually not eliminate the failure cause. A sys-
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of systematic failure
(ISO/TR 12489, 2013).
tematic failure can be reproduced by deliberately applying the same conditions, e.g., in verifying
the failure cause. Systematic failures are non-random failures. In operation, a systematic failure
is a manifestation of a systematic fault (i.e., a pre-existing state of the system). The software sys-
tematic failures, called "bugs" are examples of systematic failures: they are due to pre-existing
bugs (i.e., faults) and they occur when the input data activate them. Systematic failures are in
this standard considered a kind of dependent failures. Depending on the safety of the system
under study, the related cause may never, always or randomly happen (e.g., probability p in Fig-
ure 4.3) (ISO/TR 12489, 2013). The three cases presented in the standard address systematic
faults in connection with CCFs, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
PDS Method Handbook (2003 edition)
The PDS1 method is used to quantify safety unavailability and loss of production for SIS. The
handbook has adopted the classification from IEC 61508/61511, and divides failures into ran-
dom hardware and systematic failures. However, the method accounts for all relevant failure
categories but also gives a detailed breakdown of systematic failures as shown in Figure 4.4.,
Z Systematic failure are failures that can be related to a particular cause other than natural
1PDS is the Norwegian acronym for "reliability of computer-based safety systems"
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Figure 4.4: Possible failure classification by cause of failure
(Hauge et al., 2013).
degradation. Systematic failures are due to errors made during specification, design, operation
and maintenance phases of the lifecycle. Such failures can therefore normally be eliminated by
a modification, either of the design or manufacturing process, the testing and operating proce-
dures, the training of personnel or changes to procedures and/or work practices.
Systematic failures are further split into:
• Software faults can be caused by programming errors, compilation errors, inadequate
testing, unforseen application conditions, change of system parameters, etc. Such faults
are present from the point where the error in code is developed until the fault is detected
either through testing or through improper operation of safety function. How this fault
can be revealed through reliability growth testing is discussed in chapter 7.
• Hardware related systematic failures are failures (other than software faults) introduced
not only during the design phase of the equipment but also during modifications/repairs.
• Installation failures are failures introduced during the last phases prior to operation, i.e.,during
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installation or commissioning. If detected, such failures are typically removed during the
first months of operation and such failures are therefore often excluded from data bases.
• Excessive stress failures are caused by overstressing the component beyond its design
specification. This may be caused by either internal or external influences to the medium.
• Operational failures are caused by human errors during operation, testing, maintenance
or repais.
NOG 070 guideline (2004 edition)
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (NOG, formerly known as OLF) has developed a guide-
line, NOG 070, to support the implementation of the two IEC standard series, IEC 61508 and IEC
61511. In the regulations from the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority, specific references are
given to the IEC standards and the NOG 070 guideline. Neverthless, NOG 070 recommends the
use of the PDS method from the previous section for the quantification of loss of safety.
In line with other definitions given in this report, this guideline defines systematic faults as:
Z Systematic faults are faults in hardware and software introduced during specification, de-
sign, operation or maintenance/testing, which may result in a failure of the safety function un-
der certain conditions (e.g., for particular input signals states) (NOG 070, 2004).
4.3.2 Importance of Systematic Faults
Systematic failures/errors are a major source of CCFs, because of the potential to disable redun-
dant devices which dominate the reliability of SIS (Gentile and Summers, 2006).
All software faults are systematic, thus demonstrating the safety of software relies upon as-
sessing the likelihood of this type of fault. Software within safety critical systems is increasing
in size and extent of use, and the result of this is that risks associated with software systematic
faults becoming more prevalent. The level of authority given to and complexity associated with
software within safety critical applications means that it is of great importance to assess and
argue about the effects of software with respect to system safety. It is not possible to use statis-
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Figure 4.5: Failure cause of control system by lifecycle phase
(HSE, 2003).
tical analysis to predict the probability of systematic faults, thus for software it is not possible to
quantify the risks.
4.3.3 Types of Systematic Faults that can be Revealed in the Design and De-
velopment Phase
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2003) classifies the causes of failure of control systems
by lifecycle phase and represent it on a pie chart as shown in Figure 4.5. It is acknowledged
that because of the small sample size the results of the analysis have low statistical significance,
and therefore care needs to be taken in using these results to generalise for all control system
failures. Even so, there are many useful lessons to be learned from summaries of incidents such
as these.
The analysis suggests that most control system failures may have their root causes due to in-
adequate specifications. In some cases this was because insufficient hazard analysis of the EUC
had been carried out; in others it was because the impact on the specification of a critical failure
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mode of the control system had not been assessed. The control system needs to be continually
reviewed throughout all lifecycle phases, both from the perspective of the EUC and the detailed
design and implementation of the control system itself. Otherwise the end result is a machine,
or plant, with inadequate protection against the hazard. Other studies provide support for these
conclusions. In the area of software development a number of studies have shown that errors
made during specification account for most software faults and failures (HSE, 2003).
Figure 4.5 shows that over 50% of the faults occur within the specification, design and de-
velopment phases which is the main focus of this thesis. Types of systematic faults that can be
revealed in these phases of the lifecycle includes:
Systematic software faults
Software faults are systematic faults. The causes of software failures can either be error of omis-
sion or an error of commission. Systematic faults are mainly due to human error. An Error of
omission is an error that results from something that was not done. This includes (Son and Kim,
2009) and (Herrmann, 1999):
• Incomplete or non-existent requirements
• Undocumented assumptions
• Not adequately taking constraints into account
• Overlooking or not understanding design flaws or system states
• Not accounting for all possible logic states
• Not implementing sufficient error detection and recovery algorithms
Error of omission results from the inability of software designers to understand system require-
ments from functional domain specialists. Domain experts tend to take for granted things which
are familiar to them, but which are usually not familiar to the person eliciting the requirements.
Error of commission are caused by making a mistake or doing something wrong in a soft-
ware development process. Examples of errors of commission include (Herrmann, 1999):
• Logic errors
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• Faulty designs
• Incorrect translation of requirements in software
• Incorrect handling of data
• Faulty system integration
A typical example of logic errors is the inadequate use of logic costructs - CASE constructs or
IF/THEN/ELSE constructs - resulting in an unintended output (Herrmann, 1999). Adequate
care should be taken by software engineers against errors when using logic constructs because
of different evaluation and execution mechanisms of the constructs.
Examples of hardware related systematic fault can be a failure arising from incorrect, in-
complete or ambiguous system specification
Chapter 5
Common-Cause Failures
5.1 Introduction
As part of the SIS lifecycle design process, the SIS should also be evaluated (not only for its SIL
but) for its potential for CCF. IEC 61508 states that to maintain the safety integrity of SIFs, CCFs
needs to be controlled.The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been spearheading
the research on CCF through the development of CCF models, collection of data on CCF, and
analysis of the data. The biggest effort in this regard is made by the Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA) and the International Common Cause Data Exchange (ICDE). Also the aviation industry
and the Norwegian oil and gas industry have done some work in this field.
5.2 Definition of Common-Cause Failure
Z Common-cause failures is a subset of dependent failures in which two or more component
fault states exist simultaneously, or within a short time interval, and are a direct result of a shared
cause (NUREG/CR 6268, 1998).
This definition from the nuclear industry suggests that the components do not have to fail at
the same time, but the components must be in a fault state at the same time, or nearly the same
time. For a SIF where the sensor subsystem has n items, two or more dangerous undetected
(DU) failures can occur at different times in the same proof test interval. Because the DU failures
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are undetected, the items remain in DU fault states until the proof test is carried out. According
to this definition, a CCF of DU failures has therefore occured if two or more DU faults (with a
shared cause) are revealed in a proof test (Rausand, 2014).
The international standard IEC 61508, Part 4 Definitions and abbreviations, defines:
Z Common-cause failure. Failure that is the result of one or more events, causing concurrent
failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure
(IEC 61508, 2010)
There are two issues raised in this definition.
• Common-cause failures is specified to be "one or more events". A condition, such as
"higher humidity than specified", is not an event, and can therefore not be a common-
cause according to the IEC 61508 definition.
• The term "concurrent failures" as used in the definition implies that the failure events
must occur concurrently or close in time but failure is an event that takes place at a specific
time. This negates the definition given for CCF by the nuclear industry.
.
Rausand (2014) combined the two definitions from the IEC 61508 and the nuclear industry to
come up with the definition below.
Z Common-cause failure. Failure, that is the direct result of a shared cause, in which two or
more separate channels in a multiple channel system are in a fault state simultaneously, leading
to a system fault.
Categories of CCF : CCFs can be classified into two:
• Shock failures. Simultaneous failures that occur at the same time due to shock or
• Multiple failures that occur over a certain period due to an increased stress (e.g., temper-
ature, humidity, vibrations).
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between root cause, coupling factors and failed items E1, E2, E3
(Rausand, 2011).
It is important to note that increased stress may not lead to a CCF of the second category but may
increase the independent failure rates of the affected channels. In some cases, the increased
stress may imply that the constant failure rate assumption is no longer valid and that the chan-
nels will have increasing failure rate functions (Rausand, 2014).
There can be multiple failures with a shared caused that are not a CCF, this is described with
the term Multiple failure with a shared cause (MFSC). This is a failure that is a direct result of a
shared cause, in which two or more items are in fault state simultaneously.
5.3 Causes of Common-Cause Failure
It has been shown by Paula et al. (1991), Rausand (2011) and also by Rausand (2014) that it is
useful to split the shared CCF cause into two elements, a root cause and a coupling factor.
Z Root cause: The root cause of a specified failure is the most basic cause that, if corrected,
would prevent recurrence of this and similar failures.
In root cause analyses, the series of causes is pursued until the fundamental, correctable
cause has been identified (DOE-NE-STD-1004-92, 1992). The study of root causes helps system
designers to include in the design of the system control measures for reducing the predisposi-
tion to both single failures and CCFs. Causes of CCFs in complex systems have been linked to
human actions and not following the laid down procedures. A study of centrifugal pumps in nu-
clear power plants shows that the root causes of about 70% of all CCFs are related to this cause
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Table 5.1: Examples of root causes of CCF events in the design and development phase of SIS
life cycle (Hokstad and Rausand, 2008)
Cause type Examples of specific cause
Design requirements Failure of designer to predict an accident
Inadequate specifications Failure of designer to recognize what
proactive action is needed
Design error or inadequacy in design realization Inadequate facilities for operation, maintenance,
testing or calibration
Design limitations Financial, spatial
(Miller et al., 2000).
Practically, root causes of component failures are rarely and not often revealed from failure
cause descriptions. They are determined through root cause analyses in addition to the use of
checklists of generic root causes (DOE-NE-STD-1004-92, 1992).
Z Coupling factor: A property that makes multiple components susceptible to failure from a
single or shared cause.
Such properties incude: same design, same hardware, same installation staff, same main-
tenance or operation staff, same procedures, same environment and same location. Studies of
CCFs in nuclear power plants indicate that the majority of coupling factors contributing to CCFs
are related to operational aspects (Miller et al., 2000).
Coupling factors explains why several components are affected by the same root cause, and are
called coupling mechanisms. For example, same inadequate design is chosen for several valves.
Poor design can be a root cause, and when the same poor design is carried out on several com-
ponents, it is then a coupling factor. The root cause and the coupling factor constitute a CCF.
Investigations show that little or no CCF data from the oil and gas industry is available for
public use. The nuclear industry industry has been leading the development of CCF models
with respect to collection and analysis of data, and has since the early 1970’s considered CCFs
in their risk analysis. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has initiated the International Com-
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mon Cause Data Exchange (ICDE) project to encourage collection and analysis of data related
to CCF events. However, the actual data available to the public are restricted. Data on centrifu-
gal pumps as presented in Miller et al. (2000) shows the distribution (of root causes and coupling
factors) among the events with complete CCF:
• Root causes: 70% human actions and procedural deficiences, 20% hardware related
• Coupling factor attributes: 66% operational, 33% hardware related
Though centrifugal pumps are not part of SIS in the oil and gas industry, the product develop-
ment has similar levels of safety integrity requirements , and components are within the same
category as SIS. Hence, data related to CCF event can be assumed to be valid for analysis of SIS.
5.4 Relationship between Systematic Failure and Common-Cause
Failure
From previous sections of the report, it has been established that CCF is the concurrent failure
of two or more structures, systems or components (SSCs) due to the triggering of a single sys-
tematic fault or causally related faults by a single specific event. The triggering event may be
related to time, data or hardware. The term "common-mode failure" is not used because CCF is
more inclusive of the effects related to the failure (NP-T-1.5, 2009).
A systematic fault affects all forms of component, be it hardware or software. The fault may
be introduced during the design or the manufacturing process, or it may be related to main-
tenance or modification activities. Faults introduced during design and development are of
particular importance here. A triggering mechanism is a specific event or operating condition,
which causes SSCs to fail due to the latent fault. Thus a systematic failure is related in a de-
terministic way to a certain cause (IEC 61508, 2010). The failure will always occur when the
design fault is challenged by the triggering mechanism. In order for such a failure to occur, the
following conditions must be present:
• A systematic fault must exist in multiple components in the integrated system;
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• A triggering event must occur to challenge the systematic fault.
A CCF is a systematic failure that occurs when failures of separate SSCs are triggered concur-
rently. The failures are considered concurrent if the interval between the failures is too short for
repair or recovery measures to be taken (NP-T-1.5, 2009).
A given system may contain systematic faults. However, the faults do not become failures
until they are challenged, and the failures are not harmful unless they impair the safety function
when it is required. This implies that, not all faults become failures, and not all failures are
harmful. Further, a given failure is not a CCF until multiple channels of a redundant system
are affected. Therefore, it is not important to ensure that software faults are removed from the
system design but it is necessary to demonstrate that software does not contain faults which
may be triggered to become harmful, that can in turn lead to CCF. Since it is impossible to assure
that software faults have been removed in the sytem design, except in situations where 100%
functional testing can be performed, it is then necessary to incorporate defensive measures into
the design to ensure safety of the system.
5.4.1 Types of Systematic Faults that do not Lead to a Common-Cause Fail-
ure
From the previous section, it has been established that the existence of a triggering mechanism
and a latent fault is necessary to cause the coincidental failure of two or more channels. Redun-
dant channels are rendered ineffective when the triggering mechanism causes the concurrent
failure of the channels thereby leading to a CCF.
Systematic faults listed below do not lead to CCF if they are not challenged and also if the
failures affect only one channel:
• Errors in standard functions, such as trignometric functions, which can result in incorrect
calculations
• Operating outside the valid parameter bounds of an algorithm or standard function can
result in incorrect calculations or out of range results
CHAPTER 5. COMMON-CAUSE FAILURES 44
• Loss of accuracy due to poorly constructed algorithms
• Inaccurate calculations or incorrect trip determinations
• Improper safety design can result in failure of the safety function when needed
• Errors in amplitude quantisation and sampling frequencies can affect transient response
resulting in incorrect operation of the control system
• Inconsistencies in data communication protocols can cause incorrect operation
• Errors in software libraries can result in a variety of improper operations
5.5 Design Measures Against CCF
Prevention of CCFs in SISs starts at the top level of the whole SIS architecture. IEC 61508-6
presents three overall measures that can be used to reduce the probability of CCFs. These are:
1. Reduce the overall number of random hardware and systematic failures. (This reduces the
areas of the ellipses in Figure 5.2 leading to a reduction in the area of overlap)
2. Maximize the independence of the channels (separation and diversity). (This reduces the
amount of overlap between the ellipses in Figure 5.2 whilst maintaining the area.)
3. Reveal non-simultaneous CCFs while only one, and before a second, channel has been
affected, i.e. use diagnostic tests or proof test staggering.
Two main methods are used to minimize the number of faults in SISs: fault avoidance/prevention
and fault detection/removal.
Fault avoidance/prevention approaches are used in the design and development phase to re-
duce the number of faults introduced during this phase of SIS life cycle. The strategies applied
here should be able to address sources of faults listed in section 4.3.3.
The main fault avoidance principles as listed in (NP-T-1.5, 2009) are:
• Making functional specification less complex in system/software design;
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Figure 5.2: Relationship of CCFs to the failures of individual channels
(IEC 61508, 2010).
• Application of well defined development processes with defined activities, well-specified
deliverables and documentation, and clear attribution of responsibilities;
• Use of appriopriate methods and tools;
• Use of competent, knowledgeable personnel, having sufficient resources, equipment and
time;
• Application of suitable rules and guidelines for each activity of the development process,
providing reasonable defence against systematic faults and CCFs.
• Use of dependable and well understood components and platforms. Components may
be software components, hardware components or equipment integrating hardware and
software.
• Taking into consideration lessons learned from past mistakes and faults in similar systems
in order to improve development processes, methods and tools, rules and guidelines, as
well as training.
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Fault detection/removal. The techniques employed here are testing, formal inspection and for-
mal design proofs. They are applied during system/software development, mainly in verifica-
tion and validation activities. Other measures will be discussed in the chapter 7.
Chapter 6
Reliability Growth Testing
To help equipment and systems meet the required operational reliability, the concept of relia-
bility growth testing and management has been developed for equipment/system development
programmes.
Z Relability growth is defined as the positive improvement of the reliability of an equipment
through the systematic and permanent removal of failure mechanisms (Handbook, 1998).
The success of reliability growth depends on the extent to which testing and other improve-
ment techniques have been used during development and production to reveal design and fab-
rication flaws and the rigor with which these flaws are analyzed and corrected. There are three
essential elements involved in achieving reliability growth:
1. Detection of failure causes (by analysis and test)
2. Feedback from failure causes identified
3. Effective redesign effort based on problems identified
Failure causes are detected through testing, and the testing process controls the rate of reliability
growth. The reliability growth process is therefore called test, analyze, and fix (TAAF). Reliability
growth testing (RGT) is only one aspect of the reliability growth management programme.
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Figure 6.1: Test, analyse, and fix (TAAF) cycle
(Murthy et al., 2008).
Z Reliability growth testing is the same as TAAF testing of a product early in the development
cycle when design changes can be made readily in response to observed failures (Murthy et al.,
2008).
The objectives of RGT includes:
• Identify problems as early as possible in the design phase
• Verifying improvements in design reliability
• Identifying any necessary design changes
• Determining if the product design has to be improved to meet the specified reliability
RGT ensures that development testing is systematically carried out to track the progress of reli-
ability improvement efforts and forsee system reliability given the anticipated rate of improve-
ment. The aim here is to improve reliability and not to assess reliability. The item is exposed
to environmental stresses simulating actual usage until failure occurs. The failure is analysed
and the causes identified. Design modifications are made to avert or drastically reduce the like-
lihood of recurrence of the same failure mechanism. The TAAF process is an iterative process
and is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
6.1 Literature Review of Work done on Reliability Growth Test-
ing
The TAAF process begins in the design phase and consists of tests that are structured in such a
way that it will expose the item to the kinds of stresses it is expected to go through in the field.
TAAF test design principles, and relationship of TAAF to other testing programmes have been
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discussed by Priest (1988), Handbook (1998), IEC 61014 (2003) and Murthy et al. (2008).
A number of reliability growth models have been developed to monitor the progress of the
development programme and the improvements in reliability of the item under consideration.
The works of Lloyd and Lipow (1963), Amstadter (1971), Dhillon (1983), Handbook (1998) and
Quigley and Walls (1999) are in this regard, highly appreciated in this thesis report. The theoriti-
cal and practical criticisms of these models are well documented and compared in Krasich et al.
(2004) and Walls et al. (2005).
A failure reporting and corrective action system (FRACAS) is sometimes initiated to record
failure data gathered through test and improvement programme. The FRACAS is a closed-loop
reporting system that is a parallel to the TAAF cycle. More information on FRACAS can be found
on (O’Connor, 2002).
6.2 Reliability Growth Models and Methods
The purpose of estimating the potential reliability growth is to aid management in schedul-
ing. In some cases, a reliability growth estimate is used to determine the expected or estimated
amount of test time needed to reach a reliability level. Both continuous and discrete models
have been developed to assess reliability growth (Duane, 1964) and (Crow, 1975).
6.2.1 Continuous Growth Models
Continuous growth models were developed for repairable products in which reliability is mea-
sured in terms of mean time between failures (MTBF). The cummulative failure rate is given
by:
ωc (t )= E(N (t ))
t
⇒MT BFc (t )= t
E(N (t ))
(6.1)
The rate of occurence of failures (ROCOF) is:
ωi (t )= d(E(N (t )))
d t
⇒MT BFi (t )= 1
ωi (t )
(6.2)
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Where;
• MT BFc (t ) is the cumulative MTBF at time, t
• MT BFi (t ) is the instantaneous MTBF at time, t
Examples of continuous growth models are the Duane model and the Army Material Systems
Analysis Activity (AMSAA) model.
Duane model
The Duane model is empirical and shows linear relationship between cumulative MTBF and
time (T) when the natural logarithm (ln) function is applied in reliability growth analysis to show
the effects of corrective actions on reliability. After accelerated testing it is possible to estimate
the MTBF, which is considered the initial MTBF in the Duane model. The equation for reliability
growth in the Duane model is:
MT BFc (t )= k · tα (6.3)
• MT BFc - Cumulative mean time between failure
• t - Cumulative time
• k - A constant which depends on equipment complexity, and design for reliability
• α - Reliability growth rate
By taking the logarithm of the Duane model:
ln MT BFc (t )= lnk+αln t (6.4)
This is a straight line with a log-log scaled axis. The expected number of failures E(N (t )) at time
t can be expressed as
E(N (t ))= 1
k
· t 1−α (6.5)
The ROCOF is then
ωi (t )= d
d t
E(N (t ))= 1−α
k
· t−α (6.6)
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Figure 6.2: Duane reliability growth curve
(Yiliu).
Thus the "instantaneous" or current MTBF curves are straight lines displaced from the cumula-
tive plot by a factor 11−α , which shows up as a fixed distance on a logarithmic plot.
MT BFi (t )= 1
ωi (t )
= k
1−α · t
α (6.7)
Thus
MT BFi (t )= MT BFc (t )
1−α (6.8)
AMSAA model
This model attempts to track reliability within the series of growth testing cycles, referred to as
phases. After the conclusion of each design change (cycle), the failure rate decreases if you do
not introduce any new errors when you improve the system (Introduction of new errors is often
a problem of software development). However, before subsequent testing, the failure remains
constant.
Assume that modifications are made at ti , 0<t1<t2<...<tk . Let Ni be the number of failures that
occur in interval (ti−1,ti ). We assume that Ni has a Poisson distribution with intensity ωi , such
that
Pr(Ni = n)= [ωi (ti − ti−1)]
n
n!
e−ωi (ti−ti−1) (6.9)
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Figure 6.3: AMSAA reliability growth curve
(Yiliu).
The mean number of failures in this interval is
E(Ni )=ωi (ti − t i −1) (6.10)
The time to failure Ti of a prototype in the interval (ti−1, ti ) is hence exponentially distributed
with ωi . The MTBF in this interval is
MT BFi = 1
ωi
(6.11)
6.2.2 Discrete Models
Discrete models differ from continuous models because they measure reliability in terms of a
go/no-go situation, such as for a missile or rocket. Products that either fail or operate when
called into service are modeled by discrete functions. Examples are Lloyd and Lipow model and
Wolman model (Lloyd and Lipow, 1963).
Other reliability growth models (software) are: Jelinski and Moranda model, Littlewood and
Verrall model, Littlewood model, Musa model, Musa-Okumoto model, Brooks and Motley model,
Shooman model (Murthy et al., 2008).
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6.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models and Methods
6.3.1 Duane Model
The strengths of the Duane model are:
• The Duane model is used for reliability growth programme planning even by the propo-
nents of the AMSAA model because it is very simple to use and presented graphically
• On a log-log plot, the graph of cumulative failure rate verses the cumulative test time is
linear, this makes it easier to determine the parameters
• Above all, it is practical and it has been found that development test data from a wide
variety of applications fit the model well
• Essentially, it relates failure rate or MTBF, to improvement effort and duration
The limitations of Duane model are (Denning and Abbey Wood, 2012):
• The Duane model model is often criticised theoritically because, when t=0, MT BFc (t ) is
also zero, which is clearly untrue in practice. The Duane model also implies that given
sustained reliability effort, growth will go on indefinitely, albeit at a decreasing rate
• Since the model is essentially a graphical technique, it may tend to lack accuracy. In par-
ticular, the straightness of a series of plotted points and the fitting of a line to cumulative
data points can be highly subjective. Also, being plotted on a logarithmic scale, the model
is rather insensitive to changes in reliability occuring late in a test programme
• The model assumes a uniform level of testing and improvement effort throughout the test
programme and the prompt introduction of modification to produce reliability growth. In
practice, these conditions may not always be fulfilled.
6.3.2 AMSAA Model
The Duane model assumes that growth is a deterministic process, while the AMSAA model views
the process of reliability growth as a probabilistic process. This has advantages because the
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parameters of a non-homogenous Poisson process (NHPP) can be estimated on a statistically
rigorous basis, confidence intervals can be obtained and goodness of fit applied.
The Duane plot uses a least squares estimate of which the plot will fall while the AMSAA
model takes into account the exponential relationship between each data plot. Therefore in
reliability growth plotting, the AMSAA model tends to give a more accurate representation of
the reduction in failure rate with respect to time.
Chapter 7
Using reliability growth testing to reveal
systematic faults
7.1 Introduction
Reliability growth testing in the design and development phases can be used to reveal system-
atic faults or weaknesses that have design related causes. It is of high importance to reduce the
probability of failure due to these weaknesses to the greatest extent possible to prevent their
later appearance in the field.
In order to use RGT to reveal systematic faults, illustrative examples of functions of fire and
gas (F&G) detection and mitigations systems, mobile phone, and car air bag was carried out.
Formal and informal ways are used to conduct the test. By formal ways here, we mean testing
in the laboratory and informal ways of testing is by distributing the prototype to employees or
limited number of customers..
7.2 Illustrative Examples
This section discusses how the formal and informal RGT are conducted. The examples are cho-
sen because they are systems where RGT can be implemented on the functions to reveal sys-
tematic faults. Although mobile phone is not a SIS, it is used here as an example for a better un-
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derstanding of the concept. Some of the information about the illustrative examples are from
online sources. Accelerated Life Testing (ALT) is not the best form of RGT to be applied since
systematic faults are non-physical faults. However, in cases where the component is operating
in an environment where there is vibration, ALT can be used. For example, in the airbag ex-
ample given in section 7.2.3., the sensors are assumed to be in an environment where there is
vibration, and hence ALT is applied in the test
7.2.1 F&G Detection and Mitigation System
F&G detection and mitigation systems are key to maintaining the overall safety and operation
of industrial facilities. F&G systems are used in offshore petroleum exploration and production,
onshore oil and gas facilities, refineries and chemical plants, marine operations, tank farms and
terminals, pipelines, power plants, mining and paper mills. A F&G safety system continuously
monitors for abnormal situations such as fire, or combustible or toxic gas release within the
plant and provides early warning and mitigation actions to prevent escalation of the incident
and protect the process or the environment.
A typical F&G safety system comprises detection, logic control and alarm and mitigation
funtions. The logic solver is the central control unit of the overall F&G detection and control sys-
tem. The controller receives alarm and status or analogue signals from field monitoring devices
required for F&G detection. The controller handles the required actions to initiate alarms and
mitigate the hazard. F&G detections systems are generally programmable electronic systems
(PES) type with high safety availability and mitigation effectiveness. As modern F&G systems
are tightly integrated with the overall process safety strategy, mitigation either takes place via
the emergency shutdown system (ESD) or directly from the F&G system itself.
Assuming that about 20 prototypes of F&G detection and mitigations systems from the same
company were inspected for design errors, the system has sensors connected to logic solvers
which both contain software developed by a system integrator. The system also enables redun-
dant control of the loop. If, by any reason, the primary loop control fails, the secondary loop will
take over, and fire detection is thus maintained. Redundancy is achieved without introducing
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two set of detection loops and thus avoiding twice the amount of cabling and detectors. The
inspection covers checks on software, diversity and cabling. The system is sufficiently checked
when all the functions have been thoroughly tested.
Formal and informal methods are used in testing the functions of the F&G detection and miti-
gation systems. The functions tested are (Stanley, 2011);
• Heat detectors. A restorable heat detector and the restorable element of a combination
detector is tested by exposing the detector to a safe heat source (such as hot water, a hair
dryer, or a shielded heat lamp) until it responds. The detector should reset automatically
after each heat test.
• Smoke detectors. The smoke detectors are visually inspected first, then smoke is intro-
duced through an aerosol to ensure that smoke enters the chamber and initiate alarm.
Bee smoker can also be used as a source of relatively safe smoke.
• Remote annunciators. The function of a remote annunciator is to assist the responding
fire service personnel in locating the fire source. The labeling and clarity of the annunci-
ator layout is visually inspected. Keeping the remote annunciator to simple graphics will
often be more beneficial to emergency responders. It is important also to verify that the
zone or point indications at the remote annunciator are identical to those at the fire alarm
control unit.
• Notification appliances are bells, horns, speakers, sirens, strobes, and combination units.
One of the weakest points in many fire alarm system designs has been the audibility of the
notification appliances. The audibility is measured using a sound level meter. Never trust
the inspectors "caliberated ear".
There can also be software errors such as configuration error that can make a F&G detection
system to fail.
7.2.2 Mobile Phone (Smartphone)
Both formal and informal tests are conducted on the mobile phone. Prototypes of the mobile
phone are sometimes given to employees of the manufacturing company who gets to test the
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mobile phone applications and new features on the phone before they are actually released
to the public. The employees are advised to use the phone as roughly as possible and report
any fault back to the design team. Hardware features such as battery and processor are tested,
because to keep a smartphone running smoothly you will need a long lasting battery and a pow-
erful processor.
• Battery. Because smartphones have large screens and can perform lots of power hungry
tasks, their batteries often last for less than 24 hours. This particular smartphone is meant
to last for 18 hours in normal use, but the employees were asked to use many features con-
tinuously until the phone battery dies to check the number of hours the battery can last.
The results show that the battery can only last for an average of 10 hours of continuous
use of multiple features of the phone.
• Processor. The phone’s processor is effectively the phone’s brain, telling it what to do and
how to do it. Its performance is measured according to the number of tasks it can com-
plete per second, known as ’cycle’ - a 1 GHz processor can process one billion cycles per
second. Typically, a processor with a high speed will perform better and will give a faster,
smoother performance - though memory cache and RAM (Random Access Memory) do
also have an effect. The smartphone is marked 1 GHz processor and they were instructed
to run different programs at the same time. The results show that the speed of the pro-
cessor is much slower compared to other smartphones with the same processor speed
specification.
Software features of the phone such as the operating system, app stores and maps are also
checked. To test how effective the anti-virus software installed on the phone is, the employees
were asked to go to online store and download a game app known to contain virus and see how
efficiently the anti-virus software can protect the phone, Unfortunately the phone crashed as
the anti-virus could not protect the phone. These results were reported back to the design team
and the actions taken to deal with the faults are discussed in section 7.3
Other features of the phone tested are entertainment features such as camera and the qual-
ity of the pictures and videos are found to be good, the multi media player produced quality
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sounds and the web browser were able to access the internet. Also, connectivity features such
as frequency bands, Wi-Fi, and bluetooth were working perfectly.
Formal methods of testing mobile phones in the laboratory are provided by PC Magazine, a
technology product review company. The mobile phones are subjected to conditions even far
worst than that they will meet in operation. Most of the functions tested are:
• Reception. They identified locations throughout the laboratories where each major wire-
less carriers has very weak signal. In those locations, an attempt to connect, listen to, and
record 2-minutes calls were made on each of the phones.
• Call quality. Calls were made to automated voice-recognition systems and landline an-
swering machines, from indoor and outdoor areas with varying degrees of noisiness using
both the microphone and speakerphone. Then the messages are listened to, to hear the
quality of the sound. The sound quality shows that the phone has a systematic hardware
fault with the speakers.
• Bluetooth. Each phone were connected to mono and stereo bluetooth headsets. Using
the headsets, calls were made, activate voice dialing, and play control music. Also transfer
files to and from Mac and Windows PCs (personal computers).
• Battery life. The battery life is measured with a continuous talk-time-test. The phone
is placed in a location where it has full signal, then a "test line" is dialed with the phone’s
earpiece connected to a microphone and the microphone to a computer running audacity
recording software, with its timeline, then we let the call go until the phone’s battery dies.
7.2.3 Airbag
Airbags are passive safety devices. They are critical part of the supplemental restraint system in
most vehicles. The objective of the airbag, which is activated when the vehicle suddenly decel-
erates (as in a collision), is to prevent the vehicle occupants from hitting any rigid surfaces and
cushion the forces on their heads and upper or lower bodies. Airbags are typically made of nylon
fabric and are hidden behind panels at various locations in the vehicle, including the steering
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wheel. Depending on the crash severity, the rate at which airbags are activated is decided by the
airbag control unit. In the event of a crash, the sensor (an accelerometer) sends a signal to the
airbag control unit. This control unit triggers the inflation device, which generates nitrogen gas
by igniting a mixture of sodium azide (N aN3) and potassium nitrate (K NO3). The time between
crash detection and complete activation of the airbag is approximately 0.05 seconds.
Assuming that a customer requested for a design and development of a new airbag system,
and the customer has specified the function and the performance requirements of the airbag
system, i.e., what is to be protected (upper body, head, knees, etc. of driver and front-seat pas-
senger), and the reaction time of the airbag. As the airbag designer, the number and location
of airbags, the number and location of the crash sensors, and the type of airbag controller are
among the decisions made to achieve high reliability.
An RGT must therefore address a wide range of issues/questions which include:
1. Do we have a sufficient number of crash sensors?
2. Are they located in the "optimal" places of the car?
3. Do they respond fast enough?
4. Do they deterioriate with time?
5. Can the sensors discriminate between real and "false" decelerations? Can heavy braking
give sensor activation?
6. Is it likely that the sensors send false signals?
7. Do we have sufficient number of airbags?
8. Are they located in the "optimal" places to protect the driver/passenger?
9. Do they inflate fast enough?
10. Do they maintain pressure long enough?
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11. Does the inflation gas have any negative side effects?
12. Do the airbags deteriorate with time?
13. Can the airbags be spuriously activated?
14. When there is no passenger in the passenger seat, the airbag controller should deactivate
the airbags protecting the passenger. How can this system fail?
Prototypes of airbags are tested in a crash laboratory by a team of experienced crash engineers,
safety integration engineers, restraint engineers, consultants and project managers. The vehi-
cles are made to impact on a crash wall to test the capability of the airbag to protect the passen-
gers. The results of the crash tests are given below (Honda, 2013):
For Crash Sensors
Crash sensors collect the data necessary to make decisions about airbag deployment. They mea-
sure how quickly a vehicle slows down in a frontal crash or accelerates to the side in a side impact
crash. There are sufficient number of crash sensors which are located in the ideal areas to pro-
tect the driver and passenger. Frontal crash sensors are loacted in the front of the vehicle near
the engine, in the passenger compartment or sometimes in the electric control unit (ECU). Side
impact crash sensors may be located in the ECU, the door, the door sill, or between the front
and rear doors. Rollover crash sensors may be located in the ECU or at the vehicles center of
gravity. Sensors can discriminate between real and false decelerations. Severe or panic braking
alone cannot cause an airbag to deploy; airbags deploy only in crashes.
For Airbags
There are sufficient number of airbags to protect driver and passenger and they are located in
the right places. The driver’s airbag is stored in the center of the steering wheel; the front pas-
sengers airbag is stored in the dashboard. The two side airbags, one for the driver and one for
the front passenger are stored in the outer edges of the seat-backs.The two side curtain airbags,
one for each side of the vehicle are stored in the front, center and rear pillars. During a crash,
the airbags normally inflate within a split of a second. After inflating, the airbags will immedi-
ately deflate, so they won’t interfere with the driver’s visibility or the ability to steer or operate
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other controls. The total time for inflation and deflation is one-tenth of a second, so fast that
most occupants are unaware that their airbags deployed until they see them lying on their laps.
After a crash, you may see what looks like smoke. This is actually powder from airbags’ surface.
Although the powder is not harmful, people with respiratory problems may experience some
temporary discomfort. If this occurs, the driver and passenger should get out of the car as soon
as it is safe to do so. Airbags have long life spans. Many companies do not give recommenda-
tions on the life span of their airbags but Volvo, who have their vehicles recalled from customers
and tested them, have changed their recommendation, firstly to fifteen years, then to twenty
years as they have found the components and chemical to be stable. Mercedes-Benz originally
stated their airbag should be replaced during normal service at the customers cost after fifteen
years, but both now say the units should last the life of the vehicle. The passengers advanced
front airbag system has weight sensors under the seat. If the sensors detect a total weight on the
seat of about 30kg or less, the system will automatically turn the passengers front airbag off. The
sensors can be negatively influenced if items are placed under the front seats as this could make
the drivers seat position sensor and the passenger’s weight sensor ineffective.
The airbag can also have a problem in the software that controls airbag deployment for the
front seat passenger, the software installed on the vehicles incorrectly determines whether the
passenger seat is empty when it is, in fact, occupied. If that were to happen, and the vehicle
subsequently involves in an accident, the airbag would fail to deploy, increasing the possibility
of injury or death.
7.3 Challenges and Pitfalls of Reliability Growth Testing in Re-
lation to Systematic Faults
The general objectives of RGT especially accelerated tests are to determine the components lim-
its by applying stresses high enough to induce failures, to quickly discover the root causes of
failures that will occur in field use, and thus improve the reliability (Suhir, 2002). This section
discusses the challenges and pitfalls of RGT in relation to systematic faults.
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RGT to assess product performance is usually done in controlled conditions and an envi-
ronment that mimics the real world in a limited manner. The field performance depends on
several factors like operating environment, usage intensity, load (or stress) on the product. It is
important to point out here that this varies from customer to customer. SISs with rather cheap
assemblies and components can be tested in the way described above. Some SISs are, however,
so complex and so expensive that it is not possible to do any degradation testing apart from
some minor components. An example is a high integrity pressure protection system (HIPPS) on
a subsea oil and gas pipeline. The valves of such a system are so big and so expensive that it
is not possible to do any reliability testing at the assembly (valve) level. We, therefore have to
accept the testing of minor parts like seals, material samples, etc (Murthy et al., 2008).
Other pitfalls can be grouped into the following categories (Meeker et al., 2013):
• Pitfalls that occur during the planning of the test
• Pitfalls that occur during the execution of the test
• Pitfalls that occur during the analysis and interpretation of the test data
7.3.1 Pitfalls During RGT Planning
This section deals with the pitfalls that are associated with the early stages of planning an accel-
erated test.
1. Testing at too severe stresses (requiring extreme extrapolation). Testing at high levels of
the accelerating variable, far away from the use level of the accelerating variable implies
a large amount of extrapolation. Statistical models used in the analysis of accelerated test
data are most times idealized approximations to the truth and will always contain some
degree of error. Extrapolation to use conditions will greatly amplify these errors that are
always present. Also, testing at levels of the accelerating variables that are too extreme
• Can result in activating new failure modes that would not be experienced at use con-
ditions. Might make the assumed model inadequate at the high stress levels.
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• Will result in greater statistical uncertainty in estimates at the use conditions (com-
pared to running at more moderate stresses that still induce failures).
2. Using unnecessarily complicated testing and data analysis. Simultaneous application
of several different accelerating variables and test plans where the level of the accelerat-
ing variables changes during the test (most commonly used in HALTs) are complicated
approaches to reliability testing. This complicated approach will not necessarily lead to
better results. Simpler test designs (e.g., the commonly used constant-stress tests) provide
cleaner data and require fewer assumptions.
Other pitfalls during test planning are: Choosing the wrong accelerating variable or having
a test plan that will not provide useful information and focusing only on the obvious failure
mode(s).
7.3.2 Pitfalls During the Execution of Test
This section discusses pitfalls that are asssociated with the execution stage of an accelerated
test.
1. Improper use of system level ALT . The purpose of most ALTs is to focus on a particular
failure mode, usually at the material or component level, and then accelerate failures by
testing at higher-than-usual levels of one or more accelerating variables, such as temper-
ature, voltage, load etc. Increasing temperature or stress on a full system (or even a sub-
system) is generally less useful. This is because the maximum allowable temperature at
higher levels of assembly (system or subsystem) will generally be much lower than the
maximum allowable level at the material/component level.
2. Inadequate monitoring of failures during ALT . There have been ALT applications where
no useful lifetime data were available at the end of the test. For example, the test to find the
lifetime of smartphone battery. The test units were placed in the chamber, the desired lev-
els of stresses were set and the units left unmonitored, without checking the status of the
units at regular intervals. After 14 hours, all of the units have failed. If possible, one should
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obtain time-to-failure information by continuous monitoring so that exact times to fail-
ure can be determined. When continuous monitoring is impossible, inspection should be
carried out at regular intervals.
3. Not inspecting survivors at the end of an accelerated test (or not fully using the infor-
mation gained from such inspections). An online source provided an example where ALT
results were not interpreted properly because inspection information, although collected,
was not properly used. In particular, a sample of refrigerator compressors was run for one
year in an accelerated test with no failures. Because there were no failures in the test, a
decision was made to launch the product. What was not reported to higher-level manage-
ment was that the unfailed compressors, when diassembled for inspection, exhibited un-
expected discolouration, providing evidence of a lubrication issue and suggesting that the
unfailed were on their way to failure. After problems were discovered from field failures,
it was determined that all of the refrigerators that had been sold would have premature
failures.
4. RGTs that generate failures that will not arise in the field. We have seen a number of
ALT and HALT programs that led to the discovery of a failure mode followed by an expen-
sive redesign effort to eliminate the failure mode, only to learn later that the failure mode
would never have occured at use conditions.
7.3.3 Pitfalls During Analysis of Test Data
This section treats pitfalls that are associated with the data analysis stage of accelerated test.
1. Attempting to estimate a life distribution from HALT . HALTs serve a useful but different
purpose than ALTs. HALTs are importantly useful tests that are often conducted in prod-
uct development processes, especially in electronic products, to discover product design
weaknesses, screen for failure modes and understand design and destruct limits (as op-
posed to estimating reliability). HALTs often lead to modifications in the design of the
product whenever there is a change in design (which could be triggered by either a HALT
or an ALT), the data would be no longer relevant for estimating the product’s reliability.
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2. Using an inadequate acceleration model. Example is using Arrhenius relationship in-
stead of inverse power relationship and vice versa.
3. Ignoring or inadequately treating interactions
4. Not comparing failure modes in the field with failure modes in the laboratory
Other pitfalls as discussed in Meeker and Escobar (1998) are:
• Multiple (unrecognized) failure modes
• Failure to properly quantify statiscal uncertainty
• Multiple time-scales and multiple factors affecting degradation
• Masked failure modes
• Faulty comparison
• Accelerating variables can cause deceleration!
• Beware of untested design/production changes
• It is difficult to use ALT to predict field reliability
7.4 Handling of Systematic Faults Revealed During the Test
Systematic faults are events that can result from one or more systematic failures. Going by this
definition, it can be argued that the methods used to handle systematic failures is covering sys-
tematic faults as well. There will still be systematic faults that are not taken care of through these
methods. To what extent they constitute a threat to the systematic safety integrity is unknown.
However, since systematic faults are not a physical fault and will always occur under the same
conditions, it is reasonable to believe that they are reduced or eliminated by the same measures
as for systematic failures.
The standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are not prescriptive and gives room for different in-
terpretations, and hence opens up for new methods, approaches and technology. They focus on
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qualitative measures for handling systematic failures by using requirements and checklists. Doc-
uments and specific guidelines are therefore provided to address various aspects of how the IEC
61508 and IEC 61511 requirements should be adopted (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2006). One
such guideline is the NOG-070, presented in section 4.3.1.
The consequences of systematic faults can have great impact on SISs. In section 4.3.2., the
importance of systematic faults is discussed. They are not only the main contributor to CCFs
but also a dominant contributor towards the overall failure probability (Hauge et al., 2013).
IEC 61508 part 2 and 3 provide standard sets of requirements for the avoidance and control
of systematic failures, which are based on expert judgement from practical experiences gained
from the industry. IEC 61511 mainly focuses on handling systematic failures and faults in the
operational phase, as the standard provides guidance to end-users on the application of SISs.
The standard states that systematic faults are best addressed through the implementation of a
protective management system, which overlays a quality management system with a project
development process.
Systematic faults are undesired - not only in the design and development phases, but in the
entire SIS life cycle. Already there are a number of tools that deal with errors in production and
operation phases. The difficulties in working with the design process stem from the fact that
mistakes made then are usually latent errors, which are those errors that cause adverse con-
sequences within the system but lie dormant for a long time. They are harder to recognize or
detect, unlike the active errors whose effects are usually felt immediately.
In preventing systematic failures and faults revealed in the design and development phases
of the SIS life cycle, the following measures are taken in addition to those discussed in sec-
tion 5.5.
1. Design reviews. The design team having received feedback from the employees on the
faults in the battery life and processor speed of the smartphone, went back to the drawing
board to redesign them. They came out with a larger capacity battery of 3100mAh that
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can last for 24 hours of continuous usage. They also came out with dual core processors.
Having two chips means that the phone is better at multi-tasking as one can handle back-
ground tasks while another can work on your active task. The extra power also means
faster interfaces and enables new functionality such as high definition video recording,
also each core works less hard to accomplish a task, and the phone should use less battery
power. Also the quality of the phone speaker was redesigned to a better one with superb
sound quality. The airbags was redesigned to a more safer one that can offer the needed
protection to drivers and passengers.
2. Redundancy. Redundant components offer protection against failures. The probability
of multiple failure is less than that of a single failure provided they are independent. Also
if the components are identical, systematic failures (design flaws) are common source of
common mode failure. Examples can be seen in the phone processor, where dual core
processors were introduced. Also we now see phones that run on quad core processors
which are faster in performance and battery life is longer. Also redundancy can be applied
in the case of F&G detectors.
This report discusses four types of redundancy (Braunl, 2014) and (Abd-El-Barr, 2006):
They are;
• Hardware redundancy
• Software redundancy
• Information redundancy
• Time redundancy
(a) Hardware Redundancy. This method uses additional hardware to overcome faults.
The inclusion of some extra hardware ensures that concurrent computations can be
voted upon, errors can be masked out or duplicate (spare) hardware can be switched
automatically to replace failed components. Three techniques of hardware redun-
dancy can be identified. These are:
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• Passive (Static). In this form of hardware redundancy, the effects of faults are
essentially masked with no specific indication of their occurrence, i.e., these ef-
fects are hidden from the rest of the system. A representative of this technique
can be seen in N-Modular Redundancy (NMR).
• Triple-Modular Redundancy (TMR) uses three times hardware plus majority
voter, if one system becomes faulty, the two other correct one mask the fault.
This technique is simple but expensive and provide uninterrupted service in the
presence of faults.
• Active (Dynamic). This technique detect the existence of fault, then perform
some actions to remove faulty hardware from system (reconfiguration).
• Hybrid approach (Passive + Active). This technique combines the advantages
of the passive and active redundancy. The advantage of this system is that it
hides the effect of faults (fault masking) while replacing faulty units with spares
(reconfiguration). This method is far more expensive that the static hardware
redundancy technique, and therefore be applied in critical conditions, such as
space applications.
(b) Software Redundancy. This technique uses extra code, small routines or possibly
complete programs, in order to check the correctness or the consistency of the re-
sults produced by a given software. Some of the software techniques used have their
hardware counterparts techniques:
• Static Software Redundancy Techniques
– N-Version Programming (NVP).The idea behind this technique is to gener-
ate N independent and different versions of the program. The versions need
to be independent so that a fault will not occur in all modules. This model
can tolerate (N −1)/2 faults. NVP is similar to TMR hardware redundancy. It
is expensive, difficult to maintain, and its repair is not trivial.
– Consistency checks. For many applications, a certain data range and con-
ditions for the result are known beforehand. Check the data range, report
error if out of bounds and restart.
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– Ad-Hoc Techniques. These techniques are application dependent. For ex-
ample, a consistency checking on a bank withdrawal can be made by check-
ing that the amount of money withdrawn from any bank machine does not
exceed a certain known a priori amount, and that the aggregate amount
withdrawn by any customer during the 24 hours period from all bank ma-
chines does not exceed his/her allowed maximum amount per day.
• Dynamic Software Redundancy Techniques
– Forward Error Recovery. The system will continue operation with the cur-
rent system state even though it may be faulty.
– Backward Error Recovery. In this case, the system use previously saved cor-
rect state information at the starting point after failure.
– Use of Recovery Blocks. In this case, write N unique versions of program
plus a single acceptance test. If the current program version fails, switch to
the next version, the system continues with the next acceptable version. The
system fails if no version passes the test. This technique can tolerate (N −1)
faults.
(c) Information Redundancy. This refers to the addition of redundant information to
data in order to allow fault detection, fault masking and fault tolerance. Examples of
added information include error-detecting and error-correcting codes that are usu-
ally added to logic circuits, memories, and data communicated over networks.
• Error Detecting Code (EDC). This is used to indicate a code that has the ability
to expose error(s) in any given data word. Exposure of an erroneous data word
is achieved by showing the invalidity of the decoded data word.
• Error Correcting Code (ERC). This is used to indicate a code that has the abil-
ity that if an error has been detected, then it is possible to determine what the
correct data would have been.
(d) Time Redundancy. This refers to the repetition of a given computation a number of
times and a comparison of the results to determine if a discrepancy exists. The exis-
tence of a discrepancy between subsequent computations indicates the existence of
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transient or intermittent faults. Hardware redundancy and information redundancy
require extra hardware for calculation and storing. These leads to higher production
cost. Instead of using extra hardware, time redundancy is used which means longer
processing time.
3. Diversity. Diverse (dissimilar) implementations offer (some) protections against CCF. Even
if all variants contain flaws, they are less likely to fail simultaneously. A processor-based
hardware module is duplicated to provide redundancy in a large-scale digital control sys-
tem, particularly in safety-critical systems. Programs within the module must also be du-
plicated. Duplication of the hardware module provides protection against failures as in
the case of the F&G detection systems. However, a problem within identically duplicated
software is likely to affect all identical modules at the same time. Therefore, software
within each hardware module should be diversified in order to protect the system from
software faults. This measure is applied in the antivirus software example. Diversity in
software is an essential factor for software fault tolerance. Diversity here refers to using
different means to perform a required function or solve the same problem. This means
developing more than one algorithm to implement a solution for software. The results
from each algorithm are compared, and if they agree, then appriopriate action is taken.
As an example to show how the effects of systematic faults can be controlled through the
use of diversity, consider a software that contain error that will manifest when the same
specific piece of code is executed in the same circumstances. Consider that diverse redun-
dant elements are designed, configured, and manufactured through different methodolo-
gies and using different components, design processes and by different teams. Diverse
channnels have different features, behaviour and reliability data. In this situation, di-
versity prevents systematic faults from affecting the redundant channels in the system
(Ramirez, 2008). The problems with diversity is that it provides limited protection against
systematic faults because of the following reasons:
• Specifications for all versions will be the same
• People (are trained to) think alike; given identical (correct) specifications, similar er-
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rors in product are likely. This has been shown in several studies such as Knight and
Leveson (1986) on n-version programming.
However, diversity can avoid systematic faults introduced by tools.
4. Simplicity of design. A simple design is easier to understand and maintain and reduces
the number of intervention errors.
5. Use of certified tools and formal methods (for software) - proof and refinement helps to
prevent systematic failure.
6. Competence and training. Designers, operators and maintainers can help to reduce sys-
tematic faults and CCFs by understanding the root causes. In all the examples given, the
management ensured that design teams are competent in their various fields. Also they
undergo training to sharpen their skills (Rausand, 2014).
7. Analysis. FMECA and other reliability analyses can identify causes of faults and propose
measures to reduce of faults.
8. Procedures and human interface. Clear procedures and an adequate human-machine
interface reduce the likelihood of human errors.
Chapter 8
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
The main objective of this thesis is to study, evaluate and discuss to what extent RGT of SISs is a
suitable approach for identifying and avoiding systematic faults. If the conclusion is affirmative,
another objective is to establish guidelines for RGT for this purpose and identify challenges and
pitfalls related to such testing. This is an extensive task and is covered in chapters 4 and 7. It was
further split into sub-objectives that the thesis attempts to give suitable answers to.
When a SIS fails to perform its intended function due to a non-physical fault in specifica-
tion, design, operation or maintenance/testing of the system (specification and design phase is
only covered in this work), the term systematic failure is more commonly used than systematic
faults to describe the event. A failure is the loss of the ability to perform as required, which is
an event, while a fault is the state when an item, component, system has failed. The standards
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 do not provide a specific definition of systematic faults, as they do for
systematic failures. All systematic failures are systematic faults and not the other way around.
All about systematic faults and its classification, difference between a failure and a fault, and the
relationship between the two terms are discussed in chapter 4. This answers sub-objectives 1,2
and 4.
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A failure will only occur when a design fault is challenged by a triggering mechanism. In
order for such a failure to occur; a systematic fault must exist in multiple components in the
integrated system, and a triggering event must occur to challenge the systematic fault. A CCF is
a failure that occurs when two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system are in a
fault state simultaneously, leading to a system fault. CCFs and its relationship with systematic
failure is sub-objective 3 and is discussed in chapter 3.
RGT is the same as TAAF (Test, Analyze, and Fix) testing of a product early in the develop-
ment cycle when design changes can be made readily in response to observed failures. The main
objective of reliability RGT is early identification of faults in the design phase, so that design re-
views can be made to improve reliability. The aim of reliability growth models is to monitor
the progress of the development programme and the improvements in reliability. Both discrete
and continuous models have been developed to assess reliability growth. Continuous models
are used in the context of continuous variables and attempts to describe the reliability improve-
ment as a function of the total test time. Examples of continuous models are the Duane Model
and the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) model. Discrete models involve dis-
crete data and are concerned with incremental improvements in reliability as a result of design
changes. Examples of discrete models are the Lloyd-Lipow model and the Wolman model. The
strengths of the Duane model lies in its simplicity, possibility to study as a linear model (after
having taken the log) and this makes it easy to determine the parameters. The Duane model is
often criticised theoretically because, when t=0, MTBFc (t ) is also zero, which is not so in prac-
tice. Also, the model may tend to lack accuracy since it is a graphical technique. Since AMSAA
model views the process of reliability growth as a probabilistic process, it has the advantage
of making it easier for the parameters of a non-homogenous Poisson process to be estimated
statistically, confidence intervals can be obtained and goodness of fit applied. This solves the
problem of sub-objectives 6 and 7, and is discussed in chapter 6.
RGT can be used to identify systematic faults. In order to demonstrate how RGT is used to re-
veal faults, illustrative examples of fire and gas detection and mitigation systems, car airbag, and
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mobile phones were used. A mobile phone, though, not a SIS, is used for a better understanding
of the concept. RGT as used in the thesis, can be formal, semi-formal or informal. Formal test-
ing means testing in the laboratory in controlled conditions and an environment that mimics
the real world in a limited manner. Informal testing is releasing the product to a limited num-
ber of customers or to employees of the manufacturer to use and keep appropriate information
relating usage mode and intensity, operating environment, failure modes and report back to the
design team for necessary corrections in design. The functions tested in the crash sensors and
airbags show that there is a software error in the logic solver that controls the activation of the
front seat passenger airbag, this makes it impossible to determine whether the seat is occupied
or not. This can be dangerous, if accident happen to occur, the airbag will fail to activate, thereby
increasing the possibility of injury or death. After a crash, the inflation gas is released, this gas is
not harmful, but may cause discomfort to people with respiratory problems. Also, it was found
out that, severe or panic breaking alone cannot cause an airbag to activate; airbags only activate
in crashes. The mobile phone was found to have design errors in the battery life and processor
speed. The design errors revealed are handled and avoided as the consequences can have great
impact on SIS. The two main methods used to minimize the number of faults in SIS are fault
avoidance/prevention and fault detection/removal. These two methods applies measures like;
design reviews, use of redundant and diverse channels, use of simple design, use of competent
designers, training of designers to overcome and prevent these systematic faults. This answers
the sub-objectives 8, 9 and 10 and is discussed in chapter 7.
8.2 Recommendations for Further Work
Since this thesis report is on "Using RGT to reveal systematic faults in SISs" and is restricted to
the design and development phases of the SIS lifecycle; therefore, research should be performed
on this topic in other phases of the SIS lifecycle.
In this work, all the RGTs - both formal and informal are assumed, a step should be taken fur-
ther, if possible to carry out practically such tests both in the laboratory and through customers.
Appendix A
Acronyms
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
ALT Accelerated life testing
AMSAA Army materials systems analysis activity
CCF Common-cause failure
DU Dangerous undetected
E/E/PE Electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic
ECU Electronic control unit
EDC Error detecting code
ERC Error correcting code
ESD Emergency shutdown
EUC Equipment under control
FMECA Failure modes effects and criticality analysis
FRACAS Failure reporting and corrective action system
FTA Fault tree analysis
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F&G Fire and gas
HALT Highly accelerated testing
HSE Health and safety executive
HIPPS High integrity pressure protection system
IC Integrated circuit
I&C Instrumentation and control
ICDE International common cause data exchange
IEC International electrotechnical commission
LOPA Layer of protection analysis
MFSC Multiple failure with a shared cause
MTBF Mean time between failures
MTTF Mean time to failure
NOG Norwegian oil and gas
NEA Nuclear energy agency
NHPP Non homogenous poison process
NMR N-modular redundancy
NRC Nuclear regulatory commission
NVP N-version programming
PES Programmable electronic systems
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of failure per hour
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QFD Quality function deployment
RAM Random access memory
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
ROCOF Rate of occurence of failures
RGT Reliability growth testing
SDV Shutdown valve
SIF Safety-instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety-instrumented system
SLC Safety lifecycle
SRS Safety requirements specification
SSC Structures systems or components
TAAF Test-analyze-and-fix
TMR Triple-modular redundancy
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